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The inherent variability of cases in legal practice in the domain of private law places 
important constraints on the conclusions to be drawn from observations from actual litigation. 
Simply put, cases in the domain of private law vary with regard to numerous features (for 
example, nature of harm, liability standard, level of fault, claims, awards, features of the 
litigants, and so forth) that may impact the processes that occur within them, yet whose 
unique contributions to these outcomes are impossible to separate. This notion poses an 
important challenge for legal theorizing and policy making, as it makes it impossible to 
ascertain which factors or processes may account for particular desirable or undesirable 
phenomena in litigation—and impossible to understand, therefore, how legal policy and 
procedure should be shaped in response. While doctrinal, theoretical approaches and field 
observations can provide important indications, their inability to provide causal evidence 
means that initiatives derived from them may be off the mark, and thereby may fail to 
produce the desired results.  
Experimental approaches provide a powerful tool to counter such limitations. These 
approaches seek to minimize or control the variability that characterizes cases in litigation 
practice, and to tease apart the effects of the numerous features on which they differ. Their 
means of doing so are laboratory or field experiments, in which actual litigation contexts are 
adapted or are simulated under controlled circumstances. In these experiments, the many, 
covarying features that characterize cases in actual litigation are disentangled by isolating 
particular key features (for example, whether apologies are provided or not) and varying them 
systematically between cases, while minimizing variability on other factors (for example, 
between types of tort, level of harm, and so on). Through this approach, the researcher can 
isolate the unique contributions of particular features or phenomena (for example, apology) to 
particular outcomes or challenges in legal practice (for example, secondary victimization). 
Thereby, experimental approaches enable the acquisition of unique causal evidence with 
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which legal theorizing and procedure can be tested and evaluated—to thereby enrich and 
advance current debate on such questions, and to inform future policy to address them (for 
example, current discussions on initiatives to facilitate apology).  
In the present chapter, experimental approaches in the domain of private law are illustrated 
by focusing on the present discussion on victim restoration in the area of personal injury 
litigation. The chapter will outline how experimental approaches have been employed to 
illuminate the debate on the sufficiency of extant financial designs of personal injury 
litigation, and to evaluate the contribution of proposed reforms in this domain. The chapter 
will thereby show how experimental approaches can be used to test theoretical predictions 
and observations from practice, and how their conclusions may be applied to inform legal 
policy about the need for, and nature of, future reforms. 
 
 
<a>PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION: CURRENT DEBATE AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
The sufficiency of extant designs of litigation is currently the subject of debate in the domain 
of personal injury litigation. Extant designs of personal injury litigation are focused on 
providing economic compensation to victims, with the aim of restoring them to the exact 
position they would have enjoyed in the absence of the injury.1 In recent years, however, 
these designs have been criticized for being excessively focused on the economic resolution 
of injury, and negligent of victims’ relational restoration. Specifically, such criticism stems 
from the insight that the harm of transgressions is not restricted to their material 
consequences, but also extends to their normative and relational implications: the fact that 
they constitute a violation against social norms and conventions that prohibit such behavior,2 
and harm a victim’s sense of being an autonomous, influential, and esteemed social actor who 
                                               
1
 Francesco D Busnelli and others, Principles of European Tort Law: Text and Commentary (Springer Vienna 
2005); Deborah R Hensler, “Money Talks: Searching for Justice Through Compensation for Personal Injury and 
Death” (2003) 53 DePaul Law Review 417; Harold Luntz, Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and 
Death: General Principles (Butterworths 2006); Ulrich Magnus and Francesco Donato Busnelli, Unification of 
Tort Law: Damages, vol. 5 (Kluwer Law International 2001); José Mulder, “How Do We Compensate a 
Victim’s Losses? An Economic Perspective” (2009) 16 International Review of Victimology 67; Andrew J 
Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee, “Death, Happiness and the Calculation of Compensatory Damages” (2008) 
37 Journal of Legal Studies 217; Eric A Posner and Cass R Sunstein, “Dollars and Death” (2005) 72 University 
of Chicago Law Review 537. 
2
 Tyler G Okimoto and Tom R Tyler, “Is Compensation Enough? Relational Concerns in Responding to 
Unintended Inequity” (2007) 10 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 399. 
3 
 
is treated justly and whose rights and identity are being respected.3 To restore a transgression, 
a resolution therefore should not only compensate the victim’s (material and immaterial) 
costs, but should address these normative and relational aspects as well. As such, a resolution 
should also convey recognition of the wrongfulness of the act, and of the perpetrator’s 
responsibility or guilt for it—and thereby reaffirm the legitimacy of the norms that were 
broken, and reempower the victim by subjecting the perpetrator to his/her capacity to 
forgive.4 
Current designs of personal injury litigation, however, have been claimed to be insufficient 
for this purpose; they are said to neglect these aspects in the resolution of injury,5 and restore 
them insufficiently through the remedies they provide.6 Firstly, in its aim to restore the victim, 
personal injury litigation focuses extensively on the consequences of the transgression (that is, 
the victim’s material and immaterial harm, such as medical costs, loss of revenue, disability, 
pain and suffering, lost future prospects, and so on), and on assigning the appropriate level of 
(economic) compensation for them.7 This focus involves little attention to the normative 
aspects of the transgression, or to its relational costs for the victim,8 and may even crowd out 
the victim’s perspective by relying extensively on the input of experts (secondary 
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 Nurit Shnabel and others, “Promoting Reconciliation through the Satisfaction of the Emotional Needs of 
Victimized and Perpetrating Group Members: The Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation” (2009) 35 Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin 1021. 
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 Okimoto and Tyler (n 2); Nurit Shnabel and Arie Nadler, “A Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation: 
Satisfying the Differential Emotional Needs of Victims and Perpetrators as a Key to Promoting Reconciliation” 
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5
 Richard L Abel, “General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian (But 
Otherwise a Great Idea)” (2006) 55 DePaul Law Review 253; Arno J Akkermans and Kiliaan APC Van Wees, 
“Het letselschadeproces in therapeutisch perspectief [Personal Injury Litigation from a Therapeutic Perspective]: 
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Law Remedies” (2011) 37 Monash University Law Review 216; Liesbeth Hulst and Arno J Akkermans, “Can 
Money Symbolize Acknowledgment? How Victims’ Relatives Perceive Monetary Awards for Their Emotional 
Harm” (2011) 4 Psychological Injury and Law 245; JE Hulst, AJ Akkermans and S Van Buschbach, Excuses 
aan verkeersslachtoffers: Een onderzoek naar baten, effectiviteit en methode van het bevorderen door 
verzekeraars van het aanbieden van excuses aan verkeersslachtoffers [Apologies to Victims of Traffic Accidents: 
A Study of the Benefits, Effectiveness and Method of Encouraging Apologies to Traffic Accident Victims through 
Insurers] (Boom Lemma 2014); Siewert Lindenbergh and Peter Mascini, “Schurende dilemma’s in het 
aansprakelijkheidsrecht – De spanning tussen financiele en relationele compensatie [Conflicting Dilemmas in 
Liability Law: the Tension Between Financial and Relational Compensation]” in Willem H Van Boom (ed.), 
Capita civilologie: Handboek empirie en privaatrecht (Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2013); Prue Vines, 
“Apologising for Personal Injury in Law: Failing to Take Account of Lessons from Psychology in 
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 Philip E Tetlock and others, “The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, 
and Heretical Counterfactuals” (2000) 78 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 853; Posner and 
Sunstein (n 1). 
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 E.g. Hensler (n 1); Luntz (n 1); Oswald and Powdthavee (n 1). 
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 Akkermans and Van Wees (n 5); Carroll and Witzleb (n 5); Hulst, Akkermans and Van Buschbach (n 5); 
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victimization).9 Secondly, to restore the victim, personal injury litigation relies on economic 
compensation, which therefore must serve as a substitute for the victim’s actual costs (as 
health cannot directly be corrected by money, unlike material harm).10 Some question, 
however, whether such reparations are sufficient for restoring personal injury, as money and 
health may not be transposable, and substituting them may be experienced as objectionable.11 
Moreover, the act of paying compensation does not directly address the normative or 
relational aspects of harm;12 rather, an economic resolution enables the perpetrator to resolve 
the transgression without having to admit to wrongdoing or guilt. These limitations are 
suggested to form an important impediment to settlement and reconciliation, and explain why 
some scholars have advocated legal reforms to address them—most notably through 
initiatives to facilitate apology.13  
Initiatives to facilitate apology in personal injury litigation advocate legal reforms that 
promote the provision of apologies by tortfeasors by prohibiting their use as evidence of 
guilt,14 or by imposing a legal duty to apologize.15 They do so because substantive apologies 
convey acknowledgment of wrongdoing and an expression of remorse,16 and thereby 
constitute an admission that the violation should not have happened, and should not happen 
again.17 Apologies are therefore regarded as a possible means of addressing the (neglected) 
need for normative and relational acknowledgment that victims experience in current designs 
of personal injury litigation—and thereby as a means of facilitating its resolution.18 
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 A Cotti and others, “Road Traffic Accidents and Secondary Victimisation: The Role of Law Professionals” 
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 Posner and Sunstein (n 1). 
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 Tetlock and others (n 6). 
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 Hulst and Akkermans (n 5). 
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 Carroll and Witzleb (n 5); Hulst and others (n 5); Vines (n 5). 
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 Jonathan R Cohen, “Advising Clients to Apologize” (1999) 72 Southern California Law Review 1009; 
Elizabeth Latif, “Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored towards Legal Solutions” (2001) 81 Boston 
University Law Review 289; Daniel W Shuman, “The Role of Apology in Tort Law” (2000) 83 Judicature 180; 
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Review 200.  
15
 Robyn Carroll, “You Can’t Order Sorriness, So Is There Any Value in an Ordered Apology? An Analysis 
of Ordered Apologies in Anti-Discrimination Cases” (2010) 33 University of New South Wales Law Journal 
360; Andrea Zwart-Hink, Arno J Akkermans, and Kiliaan APC Van Wees, “Compelled Apologies as a Legal 
Remedy: Some Thoughts from a Civil Law Jurisdiction” (2014) 38 University of Western Australia Law Review 
100. 
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 Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation (Stanford University Press, 
1991). 
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 Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meaning of Apologies (Cambridge University Press 2008). 
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 Akkermans and Van Wees (n 5); Carroll and Witzleb (n 5); Lindenbergh and Mascini (n 5); Vines (n 5); 
see also Steve S Kraman and Ginny Hamm, “Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May Be the Best Policy” 
(1999) 131 Annals of Internal Medicine 963; Tamara Relis, “‘It’s Not About the Money!’ A Theory on 
Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims” (2007) 68 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 341; Jennifer K 
Robbennolt, “Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination” (2003) 102 Michigan Law Review 
460; Shuman (n 14). 
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Initiatives to promote the provision of apologies in personal injury litigation are primarily 
based on theorizing;19 on insights derived from social scientific research;20 on observations 
from other legal domains and jurisdictions;21 and on field research involving case studies, 
interviews, and surveys.22 However, because apologies are only infrequently employed in 
litigation practice, and because proposed initiatives to facilitate them have not yet been widely 
implemented in practice, extant perspectives provide only limited indications of their potential 
contribution to personal injury litigation. For these reasons, experimental approaches, in 
which the provision of apologies and initiatives to facilitate them can directly be tested, can 
enable valuable insight into these processes. In the following, I briefly review extant legal 
approaches to apology in personal injury litigation, and highlight their relative strengths and 
limitations. I then outline how experimental approaches can be employed to extend and 
augment these perspectives, and how they can thereby enable important advances for legal 
theorizing and practice in this domain. 
  
 
<a>APOLOGY IN PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION: EXTANT LEGAL APPROACHES 
 
<b>Doctrinal and Comparative Research  
 
Insights on apology taken from doctrinal or comparative legal research are the result of 
theoretical reasoning, in which insights from a range of legal sources (for example, 
legislation, legal procedure, case law, and so on) are synthesized to develop a theoretical 
argument on (for example) the sufficiency of extant litigation designs or the value of 
apology.23 For example, such research may integrate analyses of legislation and legal 
procedure with observations from salient individual cases to develop the position that extant 
litigation designs are likely to evoke concerns over liability and pecuniary loss, which may 
motivate legal practitioners and insurers to dissuade conciliatory initiatives, and thereby 
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 For example, Cohen (n 14); Brent T White, “Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights 
Remedy” (2005) 91 Cornell Law Review 1261. 
20
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 For example, Deborah L Levi, “The Role of Apology in Mediation” (1997) 72 New York University Law 
Review 1165. 
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 See also Deborah L Rhode, “Legal Scholarship” (2002) 115 Harvard Law Review 1327; Marnix VR Snel, 




impede the resolution of personal injury.24 Insights may also be deduced from comparisons 
with other legal domains or systems, where apologies are more commonly issued or are 
facilitated through procedure or legislation (for example, comparison of legislation and 
procedure between Japan, where extant legislation encourages apology, and America, where it 
does not;25 comparison with initiatives to safeguard apology in various common law 
jurisdictions;26 comparison with criminal litigation, where initiatives exist to facilitate contact 
between victims and offenders27). As such, doctrinal and comparative approaches to apology 
offer important strengths in terms of their theoretical synthesis and development, by 
integrating insights from a broad range of sources into a theoretical argument that is firmly 
grounded in legal discourse and litigation practice. However, an important limitation to these 
approaches is their limited provision of tangible, empirical evidence with which their 
propositions can be substantiated.28 This leaves such contributions vulnerable to biases and 
errors,29 and limited in their capacity to resolve the legal debate on apology—in which the 




A second strand of insight on apology follows from field research that targets the main 
protagonists of personal injury litigation (for example, victims, perpetrators, legal 
representatives, insurers, and so on), and assesses their needs or experiences to understand the 
sufficiency of extant litigation designs and the value of apology. The majority of such 
initiatives concern anecdotal evidence or case studies on individual actors.31 However, more 
recently, such initiatives have extended to more structured research involving qualitative or 
quantitative methods.32  
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Anecdotal evidence and case studies are frequently included in doctrinal approaches to 
apology and personal injury litigation.33 They typically involve citations from verbal or 
written statements by individual actors from the practice of personal injury litigation. White,34 
for example, presents anecdotal evidence on the needs of victims taken from his experiences 
as a solicitor, to substantiate the claim that a thwarted need for apology may contribute to 
decisions to litigate. Such initiatives are commendable in that they aim to bolster their 
theoretical argument with observations from legal practice, to thereby provide (some) 
empirical evidence for their claims. However, the use of anecdotal evidence and case studies 
is highly limited for this purpose, as the provision of specific, isolated examples that support 
one’s reasoning represents no true test of the predictions’ generality.35  
Qualitative field research on personal injury litigation counters these limitations by 
collecting a sample of relevant actors or cases and systematically exploring the hypothesized 
phenomena (for example, nature of victims’ needs, settlement decisions, satisfaction 
following litigation) within them. Such contributions typically rely on interviews in which 
key concepts are systematically explored through an open format that does not restrict the 
answers that respondents may provide. Relis,36 for example, employed this method to 
compare perceptions of victims’ litigation goals between physicians’ lawyers, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, and plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases. Her study collected a sample from each 
of these groups, and explored the reasons victims described for their decisions to litigate and 
the reasons attributed to them by attorneys. The content of their responses was analyzed and 
coded, and compared between these samples. This comparison revealed that lawyers 
misperceived the goals of plaintiffs by assuming them to be (exclusively or predominantly) 
motivated by financial goals; in contrast, victims’ actual motives mostly reflected extralegal 
objectives of principle (for example, admission of responsibility, prevention of similar 
incidents, apology, and so on). This example highlights the strengths of qualitative 
approaches, in terms of their standardized (that is, semistructured) method, which enables the 
focal concepts to be systematically assessed within a sample of respondents, and their 
inductive approach, which places no preset restrictions on responses and can thereby capture 
relevant issues beyond those theorized. In these applications, qualitative approaches to 
                                               
of the Needs, Expectations and Experiences of Victims and Those Close to Them in Relation to Civil Liability 
Law. Part I, Exploratory Study] (WODC 2007); Relis (n 18). 
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 For example, Abel (n 5); Cohen (n 14); White (n 19). 
34
 White (n 19). 
35
 Rhode (n 23). 
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 Relis (n 18). 
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personal injury litigation therefore have great potential for advancing or refining extant legal 
theorizing or procedure. Nevertheless, qualitative methods also have their limitations (for an 
overview, see Diefenbach37). For one, such research is frequently laborious due to the large 
volume of responses from individual cases, and therefore must often rely on relatively modest 
samples. In legal contexts, this may be exacerbated by practical limitations in gaining access 
to litigants or legal professionals. These limitations make qualitative approaches vulnerable to 
variability, in that observations may differ on numerous dimensions that are impossible to 
separate—for example, nature of harm, severity, permanency, relationship with offender, 
duration of litigation, and so on.38 These aspects make it difficult to isolate the reasons for the 
observed phenomena (that is, causality), or to know whether they apply beyond the current 
sample (that is, generalizability). 
Survey research on personal injury addresses these limitations by targeting large samples of 
respondents and presenting them with an identical set of (typically closed-format) questions. 
Hulst and Akkermans,39 for example, employed this method to examine attitudes toward 
economic compensation for emotional harm in relatives of personal injury victims. Their 
study collected a sample of 726 relatives of personal injury victims through large market 
research panels and victim associations. These respondents were presented with quantitative 
measures that assessed their need for compensation for emotional harm; their beliefs about its 
impact on their emotional restoration; and their preferences for the appropriate level, 
procedure, and mode of its assignment. The answers of the 463 respondents whose cases 
would be eligible for compensation were analyzed. The results indicated that they displayed 
sizable needs for such compensation and favorable beliefs concerning its likely impact, 
regarding it as a gesture of acknowledgment. This example highlights some important 
strengths of survey research, in that a sizable number of cases can be collected at limited 
effort and cost (relative to qualitative approaches). Moreover, the standardization of measures 
ensures that focal concepts can be examined throughout the sample, and compared between 
categories within it (for example, respondents whose relatives were injured versus killed in an 
incident) rather than only in the subset of respondents who mention them of their own accord. 
These aspects potentially enable important advances in sensitivity to specific questions and in 
generalizability of results, making survey research well suited for testing the predictions of 
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 Thomas Diefenbach, “Are Case Studies More than Sophisticated Storytelling? Methodological Problems of 
Qualitative Empirical Research Mainly Based on Semi-Structured Interviews” (2009) 43 Quality & Quantity 
875. 
38
 See Huver and others (n 32). 
39
 Hulst and Akkermans (n 5). 
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legal theorizing. However, survey research also suffers some important limitations.40 By 
relying on standardized measures, such approaches are more restrictive than qualitative 
research and offer limited scope for capturing relevant issues beyond those theorized, which 
may threaten the validity of its conclusions. Moreover, as the example illustrates, surveys may 
also be limited by bias in sampling, due to limitations in access to, or nonresponse from, 
particular types of respondents or cases. Lastly, survey research is limited in its capacity to 
control variability, isolate causal relationships, and capture actual, legally relevant behaviors 
(for example, how may emotional awards impact settlement decisions?). 
In sum, extant legal research into the sufficiency of current designs of personal injury 
litigation, and the value of apology, is limited by a paucity of empirical support. Field 
research has been employed to redress this deficiency, and provides important insight into 
victims’ satisfaction with current (financial) designs of personal injury litigation and the needs 
that are and are not sufficiently recognized or met within them.41 But with regard to the 
present debate on apology, extant research suffers some important limitations. Most 
prominent of these is its limited capacity for illuminating the actual value or impact of 
apologies. Because apologies are infrequently offered in personal injury litigation, and may be 
offered especially in particular types of cases, field research provides only limited insight into 
their remedial value. Because proposed initiatives to facilitate apology have not yet been 
widely implemented in practice, field research cannot readily assess their benefits. Extant 
research on these questions is therefore limited to assessing respondents’ beliefs or 
predictions on the value of apology.42 Insights from psychology suggest, however, that people 
may frequently mispredict their own responses to restorative initiatives.43 As such, in order to 
understand the value of apology, and of initiatives to facilitate it, research is needed that can 
illuminate victims’ actual responses to such reparations, in settings where the influence of 
covarying features can be minimized. Experimental approaches provide a valuable means of 
doing so, and thereby can represent an important addition to the legal researcher’s 
methodological arsenal.  
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Experimental approaches aim to simulate actual litigation contexts in controlled 
circumstances, or to experimentally modify actual litigation practice in the field. In doing so, 
they aim to examine legal questions in settings where the variability that characterizes cases 
in actual litigation (for example, between types of tort, level of harm, and so on) can be kept 
constant. In this controlled setting, specific focal variables are varied or manipulated between 
cases (for example, whether an apology is provided or not; the size of the settlement being 
offered), while particular outcomes are measured (for example, level of satisfaction of 
victims’ relational needs; victims’ willingness to settle). Through this approach, the 
manipulated variables’ unique effects on these outcomes can be assessed. In this way, 
experimental approaches enable legal researchers to test causal relationships that cannot 
readily be separated in legal practice. Moreover, they can be shaped to test phenomena that 
occur infrequently in legal practice (for example, provision of apologies), or which have not 
yet been implemented in that area (for example, initiatives to facilitate or coerce apology). 
Thereby, experimental approaches can enable important preliminary insights into such 
questions, and thus contribute unique evidence to extant perspectives on private law. 
 Three major types of approach can be separated, which differ in their levels of 
complexity, control, and embeddedness in legal practice. Below, each type is described in 




Experimental approaches employing vignettes or scenarios seek to examine legal questions 
by (hypothetically) placing participants within standardized, equivalent situations and 
assessing their responses. They do so by providing them with written descriptions of legally 
relevant settings (for example, litigation following a personal injury incident), in which they 
are asked to imagine themselves.44 Within these descriptions, key variables are manipulated 
(for example, provision of apology versus no apology). Thereupon, participants are requested 
to fill in a questionnaire of (usually quantitative) dependent measures (for example, 
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 Robbennolt (n 18); Jennifer K Robbennolt, “Apologies and Settlement Levers” (2006) 3 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 333; Jennifer K Robbennolt, “Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation” 
(2008) 13 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 349. 
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impressions of the offender; decisions to settle), so that the impact of the manipulations on 
these outcomes can be assessed. 
An illustration of the vignette approach in the domain of personal injury litigation is the 
research program conducted by Jennifer Robbennolt,45 which sought to illuminate how 
apology may contribute to the settlement of personal injury litigation. To do so, Robbennolt 
constructed experimental vignettes of personal injury incidents in which an identical incident 
(a victim being struck by a careless cyclist and thereby injured) was manipulated to feature 
either an apology or no apology. Participants were instructed to imagine themselves in the 
situation and their settlement intentions were measured. The results indicated that participants 
who received an apology set lower reservation prices (lowest acceptable settlement amount) 
and showed greater willingness to settle than participants who received no apology.46  
Further research has employed the vignette method to expand on these findings. Reinders 
Folmer, Desmet, and Van Boom investigated the interplay between material and relational 
needs in the restoration of personal injury,47 by examining how the effectiveness of apology 
may be contingent on the level of financial compensation that victims are offered in 
settlement. Their research presented participants with vignettes of personal injury incidents 
based on Robbennolt’s studies, and manipulated: (1) the type of harm (material harm or 
personal injury, equivalent in cost); (2) whether or not an apology was provided; and (3) the 
size of the settlement offer (60, 90, or 100 percent of the claimed damages). When thus taking 
into account the impact of settlement offers, this study showed that while apologies 
contributed significantly to victims’ relational restoration—particularly in cases of partial 
compensation—they did not significantly facilitate settlement decisions, which were primarily 
contingent on the size of the settlement offer. In a followup to her original study, Robbennolt 
also observed potential limitations to apology when comparing the perspective of victims with 
that of legal representatives, who conduct such cases on victims’ behalf.48 Relying again on 
identical vignettes in which the provision of apology was manipulated, Robbennolt observed 
that, contrary to their appeasing impact on victims, apologies increased settlement demands 
among attorneys.  






 Christopher P Reinders Folmer, Pieter TM Desmet and Willem H Van Boom, “Is It Really Not about the 
Money? Victim Needs Following Physical and Material Harm and their Restoration through Financial and 
Relational Compensation” (2018) Manuscript in preparation. 
48
 Robbennolt 2008 (n 44). 
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These studies illustrate how experimental vignettes can be employed to enable valuable 
insight for legal theorizing and practice. Through this approach, theoretical relationships that 
cannot easily be separated or investigated in litigation practice can be examined, in a manner 
that consumes relatively little time or effort on the part of either researchers or participants. 
These aspects make experimental vignettes well suited for providing (preliminary) evidence 
on the predictions of legal theorizing—in these examples, by suggesting that while apology 
may indeed enhance victims’ satisfaction, this need not translate into a more conciliatory 
resolution, in light of its limited impact on victims’ settlement decisions and the competitive 
response it evokes in victims’ attorneys.  
However, vignette research also has some important limitations.49 Firstly, vignettes 
frequently rely on simplified representations of legally relevant situations, which may 
underrepresent the richness and complexity of the situations actually found in legal practice. 
While this enables specific theoretical processes to be isolated and tested, such processes may 
operate with greater complexity in legal practice (for example, by interacting with features of 
the case, the litigants, and so on). As such, their suitability for generating insights that are 
relevant for private law is therefore critically dependent on the representativeness and quality 
of these portrayals. Additionally, vignette research relies on respondents’ imagination of 
hypothetical incidents, and on their predictions of their likely experiences and responses. 
These may differ from the ways in which they would experience and respond to such 
situations in real life.50 Vignette research should therefore be regarded primarily as a means to 
gain insight into respondents’ beliefs or preferences, rather than to derive surefire predictions 




Laboratory experiments seek to place participants directly in legally relevant situations. They 
do so by simulating legally relevant settings or events in a controlled laboratory environment, 
representing, for example, the incident that is the subject of litigation (such as suffering 
damage—or inflicting it upon others—through wrongful or negligent behavior51) or the 
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process of litigation itself (such as negotiations over settlements, judicial decision making,52 
mediation53). In the experiment these situations are standardized between participants, so that 
all are presented with identical circumstances, while key variables are manipulated and/or 
measured. In this way, laboratory experiments enable legal researchers to let participants 
directly experience legally relevant situations or experiences, and to examine how particular 
features or phenomena (for example, provision of apology versus no apology) may impact the 
judgments, preferences, and/or behavior that they display within them. 
 While instances of physical harm are difficult to recreate in experimental settings,54 the 
restorative initiatives that have been proposed to address them in personal injury litigation 
(that is, facilitating or coercing apology) can be recreated and tested in experimental settings. 
An illustration of this is provided by the research of Saulnier and Sivasubramaniam,55 which 
examined the effectiveness of facilitating direct or indirect contact between offenders and 
victims, focusing in particular on the question of how the presence or absence of the victim 
and the level of pressure to apologize may impact the quality of perpetrators’ apologies. To do 
so, the researchers conducted a laboratory experiment in which participants were induced to 
unintentionally cause a computer crash which was thought to result in the corruption of 
crucial and irreplaceable documents. In response, offenders were requested or coerced to 
provide a written apology—either directly, by the victim of their transgression, or by one of 
his/her colleagues (in which case the victim was not present). The quality of these apologies, 
as well as their remedial potential, was assessed by independent raters. The results indicated 
that offenders’ apologies were less remorseful and exhibited less remedial potential in cases 
where they were coerced rather than requested. Moreover, offenders exhibited less remorse 
and offered less adequate apologies when apologizing directly to the victim, rather than 
indirectly through the victim’s colleague. Thereby, this study provides a valuable indication 
of the possible limitations of legal initiatives to facilitate or coerce apology.56  
A final strand of laboratory experiments that is relevant for the discussion on apology 
focuses on the question of how restorative initiatives, such as the provision of apologies, may 
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impact judicial judgment and decision making.57 Such studies fit within a broader body of 
research that is primarily focused on the domain of criminal litigation, which experimentally 
studies judicial decision making in situations where what is demanded by law may conflict 
with cognitive, psychological processes—such as the legal obligation to disregard 
inadmissible evidence or coerced confessions, despite the inability to cognitively erase that 
knowledge from one’s mind.58 Experiments study these processes by presenting judicial 
decision makers (judges, attorneys, law students) with simulated case materials that mirror 
legal practice (for example, evidence, testimonies, and so on), or by experimentally recreating 
the process of litigation in mock trials. An example is the research of Jehle and colleagues,59 
which presented mock jurors with realistic videos of a murder trial in which a defendant was 
charged with murdering his neighbor following a dispute over property lines. The (staged) 
videos were filmed at an actual courtroom, featured experienced actors, and followed the 
typical sequence of trials in the United States, including a range of realistic details (such as 
the judge prompting the attorneys and witnesses, witnesses being sworn in, and so on). Within 
this setting, the defendant’s testimony was manipulated to include either an excuse, a 
justification, a denial, or no explanation. Moreover, the remorsefulness of these accounts was 
manipulated, so that they were conveyed either remorsefully (downcast gaze and trembling 
voice, expression of sympathy to victim’s family) or without remorse (continual eye contact 
and emotionless tone). Ultimately, mock jurors’ verdicts were solicited. The results indicated 
(unsurprisingly) that, relative to other accounts, denials reduced the likelihood of a guilty 
verdict. More relevant to the discussion on apology, however, it was found that accounts 
which were accompanied by a remorseful demeanor increased the likelihood of a guilty 
verdict. This analysis is complemented by the research of Rachlinski and colleagues,60 who 
                                               
57
 For example, Brian H Bornstein, Lahna M Rung, and Monica K Miller, “The Effects of Defendant 
Remorse on Mock Juror Decisions in a Malpractice Case” (2002) 20 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 393; 
Emily P Corwin and others, “Defendant Remorse, Need for Affect, and Juror Sentencing Decisions” (2012) 40 
Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 41–9; Alayna Jehle, Monica K Miller and Markus 
Kemmelmeier, “The Influence of Accounts and Remorse on Mock Jurors” Judgment of Offenders” (2009) 33 
Law and Human Behavior 393; Jeffrey J Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie and Andrew J Wistrich, “Contrition in the 
Courtroom: Do Apologies Affect Adjudication?” (2013) 98 Cornell Law Review 1198. 
58
 Saul M Kassin and Samuel R Sommers, “Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disregard, and the Jury: 
Substantive versus Procedural Considerations” (1997) 23 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 1046; Saul 
M Kassin and Holly Sukel, “Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the “Harmless Error” 
Rule” (1997) 21 Law and Human Behavior 27; Joel D Lieberman and Jamie Arndt, “Understanding the Limits 
of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial 
Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence” (2000) 6 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 677; Kamala London 
and Narina Nunez, “The Effect of Jury Deliberations on Jurors’ Propensity to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence” 
(2000) 85 Journal of Applied Psychology 932. 
59
 Jehle and others (n 57). 
60
 Rachlinski and others (n 57). 
15 
 
examined the impact of apology on verdicts in a series of experiments with judges as 
participants. While the effects of apology were modest and fluctuated between cases, their 
results generally indicated that apologies either had no impact on judges or produced harsher 
verdicts in civil law cases, while producing mildly more lenient verdicts in criminal cases. 
These experimental studies therefore highlight that while apologies and expressions of 
remorse may respond to victims’ need for relational compensation, they may also entail 
adverse effects for defendants61—evidence that is important for the legal discussion on 
whether apology should be protected in litigation.62  
In sum, these studies illustrate how laboratory experiments can be employed to enable 
valuable insights for legal theorizing and practice. Through their capacity to recreate or 
simulate legally relevant situations while not being tied to the restrictions of litigation practice 
(for example, variability between cases, inability to interfere with procedure, and so on), 
experiments provide a unique perspective on legal processes and enable insight that may 
serve to affirm or challenge extant assumptions in legal theorizing or practice (for example, 
by suggesting that initiatives to facilitate apology may detrimentally affect their content and 
quality63). However, as a flipside to these strengths, laboratory experiments also suffer some 
important limitations.64 Firstly, their simulations or abstractions of legal practice may be 
simplified and artificial compared to the ways in which such processes may operate in real 
life, where they may interact with other features or processes that do not feature (or are kept 
constant) in the experiment. While insights from experiments may contribute valuable pieces 
to an understanding of this puzzle, their relevance for legal theorizing and practice is critically 
dependent on the representativeness and quality of their portrayals. Moreover, laboratory 
experiments may be limited by the samples they examine, which tend to include a 
disproportionate amount of college students.65 While such participants may be comparable to 
litigants in the sense that they are viable subjects of torts, they may differ in other aspects (for 
example, age, level of education, employment history), which may affect the results. 
Therefore, experiments should particularly be regarded as a means of gaining insight into 
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people’s judgments, preferences, and behaviors in legally relevant situations, rather than as a 




A final strand of experimental legal research concerns experimental approaches that are 
conducted in actual litigation contexts. Such research involves the systematic manipulation of 
particular treatments in the practice of litigation of its periphery. In such an approach, a 
treatment is implemented in one set of cases, which is contrasted with a comparable set of 
cases where the treatment is not implemented (that is, a randomized trial). This approach 
enables field experiments to directly examine the impact of the focal treatments in litigation 
practice—and thereby to directly assess their value in this domain. 
Examples of this approach that are relevant for personal injury litigation are particularly 
situated in the domain of criminal litigation, where alternative dispute resolution initiatives 
rooted in the principles of restorative justice have been tested extensively.66 An illustration is 
the research by Sherman and colleagues,67 who examined the impact of participation in out-
of-court restorative justice conferences on the restoration of victims of burglary and robbery 
in Australia and the United Kingdom. Restorative justice conferences bring together crime 
victims and offenders in a face-to-face conference, in which they discuss (1) the (reasons for 
the) incident itself, (2) its consequences for either party, and (3) the necessary means to repair 
the harm caused.68 In Sherman’s study, suitable cases were randomly assigned to follow 
either the standard legal resolution of their case or the standard resolution supplemented by a 
restorative justice conference. The study examined how this treatment impacted the provision 
of apologies and the victims’ restoration, in terms of their forgiveness for the offense, their 
vengefulness, and their self-blame. The results indicated that victims whose trajectory had 
included a restorative justice conference were vastly more likely to receive a (credible) 
apology from the offender. While there was no evidence that participation in restorative 
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justice conferences significantly increased victims’ forgiveness for the offense or reduced 
their self-blame, restorative justice did significantly reduce victims’ vengefulness. Moreover, 
a followup study indicated that restorative justice also significantly reduced victims’ post-
traumatic stress symptoms.69 Thereby, these studies provide evidence from litigation practice 
which suggests that facilitating apology may enhance victims’ restoration—at least in 
criminal contexts.  
While not technically a field experiment, an illustration of what such an approach might 
constitute in the domain of private law is provided by the pilot study by Hulst and 
colleagues,70 which tested insurer-initiated initiatives to facilitate contact between victims and 
offenders in case of traffic accidents. In this investigation, the researchers aimed to address 
the issue that, in the context of traffic accidents—where the resolution of harm is relegated to 
insurers—victims frequently indicate perpetrators’ lack of rapprochement (that is, their failure 
to seek contact and acknowledge their predicament) as an important impediment to resolution. 
To this end, Hulst and colleagues collaborated with motor vehicle insurers to test three 
insurer-initiated initiatives to facilitate contact between victims and offenders. These 
initiatives targeted either the offender or the victim with an offer to arrange written 
communication (through the insurer) between either party. A third initiative offered contact 
mediated by a major victim association. The goal of the study was to examine if these 
initiatives could effectively establish contact between these parties, and moreover, if they 
might thereby facilitate the provision of acknowledgment and apologies. Regrettably, in this 
instance the initiatives were not successful, for a variety of reasons (such as protagonists 
already having initiated contact themselves, practical difficulties in implementing the 
initiatives among insurers, limited number of observations; moreover, the study did not 
include an untreated control group in order to compare their impacts). Nevertheless, the study 
provides a useful indication of what a field experiment on relational restoration in personal 
injury litigation might constitute and how it might be implemented (and also of the difficulties 
involved in doing so). A forthcoming followup study by the same authors has capitalized on 
the lessons learned in this pilot, and will in all likelihood provide valuable novel insights into 
these processes.  
These studies illustrate how field experiments can be employed to provide important 
insight for legal theorizing and practice. By directly testing the impact of treatments in 
litigation contexts and examining whether they translate into tangible benefits there, field 
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experiments enable insights that are directly transposable to litigation practice, greatly 
enhancing the validity and generalizability of their results. However, their important strengths 
in these areas do entail some limitations in others. For one, their situation in litigation practice 
does mean that, relative to other experimental approaches, control over variability is reduced 
considerably, which leaves field experiments more vulnerable to differences between 
respondents or cases—which may be sizable in litigation practice, even for similar incidents 
(for example, even within traffic accidents, cases can vary tremendously in terms of traffic 
situation, level of fault, amount and type of harm, features of the drivers, and so on). Field 
experiments may also be restricted by practical limitations. They generally require greater 
effort and organization, and may suffer important limitations in light of legal restrictions (for 
example, current legislation is unlikely to permit a trial to coerce apology in some cases and 




<a>EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES TO PERSONAL INJURY: CONCLUSIONS FOR 
PRIVATE LAW 
 
The present chapter addressed the question of victims’ restoration in personal injury litigation 
to illustrate how experimental approaches can complement and extend legal theorizing in the 
domain of private law. It illustrated how empirical research employing experimental 
vignettes, laboratory experiments, and field experiments can contribute crucial pieces to the 
puzzle of understanding whether, and how, victims’ neglected relational needs should be 
addressed in future litigation. They do so through their capacity to control variability, to 
examine causal relationships, and to capture phenomena that occur infrequently (or not yet at 
all) in legal practice. On the one hand, through these important strengths, experimental legal 
research provides insight that confirms the prominence of normative and relational concerns 
in victims’ need for restoration in personal injury,71 consistent with extant legal research.72 On 
the other hand, however, insights from experimental legal research raise questions regarding 
the value of the theorized initiatives to facilitate apology for redressing these concerns, and 
for promoting the resolution of personal injury litigation.73 While experimental approaches to 
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this question support the prediction that sincere and exhaustive apology can increase 
satisfaction of victims’ normative and relational needs, they cast doubt as to whether the act 
of doing so will translate into its theorized benefits for the resolution of such cases—which, 
according to such evidence, remains primarily driven by economic outcomes.74 Moreover, 
although such evidence underlines the relational value of exhaustive apologies, insights from 
experimental approaches cast doubt over whether proposed initiatives to facilitate them are 
likely to result in such substantive apologies.75 And lastly, while apologies may benefit the 
relational restoration of victims, experimental evidence suggests that their provision may be 
met less favorably by other legal protagonists, such as  judicial decision makers76 and 
attorneys.77 While these findings demand further investigation with regard to litigation 
practice, they do highlight possible limitations to apology which legal theorizing and practice 
may need to address in order for them to fulfill their remedial potential.  
More generally, this chapter illustrates how experimental approaches can constitute a 
valuable addition to the methodological arsenal of scholars in the domain of private law, with 
which the theoretical discourse of doctrinal approaches can be supplemented with empirical 
evidence, to thereby strengthen its argumentation and predictions.78 Experimental approaches 
can enable legal researchers to obtain evidence that speaks to the validity of the assumptions 
that underlie theorizing or policy in the domain of private law—for example, on the factors 
that deter transgressions (for example, do liability and penalties promote more careful 
behavior79), the reasons that underlie people’s decisions to litigate (for example, does 
facilitating victims’ understanding of their rights promote decisions to pursue litigation80), and 
the way in which law and legal procedures are applied by judicial decision makers (for 
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example, to what extent are laws applied consistently and without bias;81 to what extent are 
legal claims influenced by evidence82). Thereby, experimental approaches can be employed to 
enrich legal theorizing on a wide range of questions relevant to private law. Importantly, 
however, experimental approaches may also be valuable to litigation practice. Firstly, they 
can be employed to provide stakeholders with valuable insight into extant legal procedure. A 
case in point is their capacity to illuminate how victims’ various needs are (and are not) met 
in extant litigation designs.83 Such insights may be useful to law and policy makers in light of 
their objective to “exactly restore the victim.”84 Similarly, their capacity for identifying 
mismatches between the perspectives of different legal agents—such as the notion that 
attorneys’ reactions to apologies may be opposed to those of their clients85—may be valuable 
to victim and attorney associations in their efforts to prevent misunderstanding and to ensure 
that, when in pursuit of their clients’ interests, attorneys do not act in ways that oppose their 
recovery.86 Experimental approaches may also be valuable to litigation practice as a means to 
assess novel reforms or procedures, for example by testing their effectiveness in field 
experiments.  
Through these applications, experimental approaches may contribute to legal theorizing, 
procedure, and policy that is more strongly rooted in empirical evidence,87 and thereby more 
attuned to the way that legal agents actually think and act (rather than how we want or believe 
them to). In order to fulfill this potential, however, it is crucial that experimental approaches 
are employed in ways that maximize their strengths and legal relevance, and that counter their 
limitations.88 Findings from experimental research may often be contingent on the ways in 
which they represent legal situations and the focal variables within them, and in the outcomes 
they examine (and the way in which these are measured). Experiments that examine different 
types of cases (for example, temporary versus permanent harm; incidental encounters versus 
ongoing relationships), assess different types of outcomes (for example, settlement intentions 
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versus settlement decisions; anticipated versus actual response to apology), or examine 
different populations (for example, judges, attorneys, victims; law students, general 
population) may produce different results. This underlines the importance of replication to 
understand the stability of the observed effects and to identify important moderating variables 
that may shape their magnitude (for example, how the effect of apology may vary according 
to its source, timing, and so on). In this process, experimental approaches could be combined 
with different methods in a process of triangulation, where their collective strengths can 
counter their individual limitations (for example, developing a theory by combining doctrinal 
examination of legal sources with qualitative field research in litigation practice; testing it in 
experimental research; developing policies from the results; testing them in field 
experiments). 
Before closing, it is important to underline that in order to fulfill their potential value for 
the domain of private law, experimental approaches require the expertise of legal scholars, to 
ensure that experiments are optimally attuned to the intricacies of legal theory and practice in 
this domain. Herein lies the bridge between these methods and classical doctrinal approaches 
to private law, and the considerable advances that may be possible by integrating the two. To 
reap these benefits, the challenge for the domain of private law is therefore to advance the 
empirical foundation of legal scholars’ work, or to invest in profound collaborations with 
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